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Quantum dot physically unclonable functions (QD-PUFs) provide a promising solution to the issue of 
counterfeiting. When quantum dots are deposited on a surface to create a token, they form a unique 
pattern that is unlikely to ever be reproduced in another token that is manufactured using the same 
process. It would also be an extreme engineering challenge to deterministically place quantum dots to 
create a forgery of a specific device. The degradation of the optical response of quantum dots over time, 
however, places a limitation on their practical usefulness. Here we report methods to minimise the 
degradation of photoluminescence (PL) from InP/ZnS quantum dots suspended in a polymer and 
demonstrates reliable authentication using a fingerprinting technique to extract a signature from PL, even 
after significant degradation has occurred. Using these techniques, it was found that the addition of a 
polylauryl methacrylate (PLMA) copolymer improved the longevity of devices. The best performing 
example of this was the Polystyrene-PLMA based material. From this, it is projected that 1,000 bits of 
information could be extracted and read after a period of years, therefore providing a compelling solution 































Each year billions of pounds are lost due to ineffective anti-counterfeiting measures [1]. Many 
contemporary anti-counterfeiting solutions rely on simply being difficult to replicate, often restricting 
access to materials or through complex patterns [2] [3]. The key issue is one of a lack of asymmetry in the 
anti-counterfeiting measure’s production. There is nothing that physically prevents an attacker from 
cloning some of the most complex anti-counterfeiting measure [4]. 
One method of solving this issue can be found in physically unclonable functions (PUFs) [5] [6]. A PUF is a 
hardware-based cryptographic primitive which, in a perfect scenario, provides a unique fingerprint for 
authentication purposes. This information will only become accessible to a user as a response to a 
particular challenge [5].  From a cryptographic standpoint, PUFs are classified as one-way functions, their 
unique nature prevents an attacker from deciphering how to recreate a particular PUF [4]. Methods of 
creating PUFs include stochastic processes [7] and nanomaterials [8], in particular optically-active quantum 
dots [1] [9]. 
Colloidal quantum dots (QDs) suspended in a lacquer or solvent and applied to a substrate prior to curing, 
can form a token containing a random arrangement of dots, formed in clusters with a range of sizes [10]. 
Owing to the effect that quantum dot clustering has on the energy levels within each CQD this produces a 
unique emission pattern when excited. This by itself however, can be simulated. The appeal of CQDs 
therefore lies in their non-linear response to increasing incident light, as this can be used to detect the 
presence of a fake [1] [11]. Thus, CQD patterns can be used for authentication purposes.  
Here we demonstrate the creation of such optical-read tokens known as quantum dot PUFs (QD-PUFs). A 
response derived from dots’ emission in the token is stable for a finite period of time, which is tested using 
an authentication algorithm. Emission from the tokens is excited using incoherent light within the visible 
spectrum. 
The stability of emission from colloidal QDs (CQDs) depends on the respective stability of their morphology 
and chemistry, which is typically limited by the rate of oxidization when they are exposed to air [12]. To 
reduce, this CQDs can be suspended in a polymer matrix, where the effectiveness of this approach 
depends on the polymer’s oxygen diffusion rate and their compatibility with the CQDs used [13]. As such 
alongside the creation of the QD-PUF token five different polymers (PMMA, PS, PMS, PVDF and SEBS), and 
their co-polymer variants when combined with PLMA, were tested to maximise longevity and emission 
intensity. 
Experimental 
To create the QD-PUF tokens, InP/ZnS QDs with oleylamine surface ligands were dissolved in toluene 
before being combined with a polymer. This solution was then applied to a black coloured polyethene 
substrate using a micrometre doctor-blade method to form a dry film with fixed deposition thickness. The 
tags were then kept at 60° C in a vacuum oven overnight to cure the polymer.  Specific details about the 
parameters used can be found in the supplementary information. Each QD-PUF token was then stored in a 
container that was open to the air. This ensured that the only factor mitigating the degradation of the 
emission from the CQDs was the lacquer they were suspended in. 
To determine the optimal polymer matrix to minimise oxidization of the QDs suspended within, five 
separate polymers were tested initially (Polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA), Polystyrene (PS), Polystyrene-
ethylene-butylene-styrene (SEBS), polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) and Poly 4-methlstyene (PMS)), which 
are labelled Group 1 in this work.  
The addition to the formulations in Group 1, a second test group of tokens (dubbed Group 2) was created 
with the addition of polylauryl methacrylate (PLMA) to the five polymers from Group 1. This acted as a 
copolymer and was added to achieve more rapid photoluminescence stabilization. 
 
Figure 1: a) A schematic of the apparatus used to measure PL intensity maps and to captures images of each token. The quantum dots in each 
token were excited using white light filtered through a 450nm short-pass filter. A 500nm long-pass filter placed in front of the CCD ensures only 
light from the emission of the QD-PUF is measured. The entire apparatus is sealed within a closed black box when measurements are in 
progress. b) Using the apparatus in a) each token is imaged on the day of its creation and each subsequent day after. The fingerprint generated 
on the subsequent days is compared to that of day 0 to determine if it matches the original fingerprint. 
Photoluminescence (PL) from each token was measured using the same apparatus as was used to apply 
the challenge to extract the fingerprint. This is shown in Figure 1a. This approach has benefits over 
previous work [1] involving QD-PUFs, as there is no requirement for high-resolution optics to extract 
responses from the tokens. 
For the purpose of turning the captured images of the PL emission patterns from each token into a binary 
response for a computer vision technique known as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [14] was applied in a 
modified form. The procedure used is shown in Figure 1b and detailed in the supplementary information. 
This modified variant was used to generate noise-resistant fingerprints and is referred to as the reduced 
LBP (R-LBP). In-depth analysis of the cryptographic security of the generated fingerprints is beyond the 
scope of this paper which demonstrates them as a proof of concept. The metrics used to analyse the R-LBP 
results (FPR and ENIB) serve as a measure to judge the stability of QD-PUF generated fingerprints over 
time. The false negative rates (FNR) of the generated fingerprints are not reported as their value fell below 
the precision of the implementation of the code used in MathWorks MATLAB.  
 
After having been made (day 0), each token was imaged 100 times, and R-LBP algorithm was applied to 
each capture to generate a corresponding fingerprint. 50 of these fingerprints were set aside to use as 
reference fingerprints in order to calculate hamming distances later on. The other 50 were used as test 
fingerprints. Each test fingerprint was compared to each of the reference fingerprints of the same tag, in 
order to generate an intra-hamming distance distribution. The test fingerprints were then compared to 
each reference fingerprint of every other token type in order to generate the inter-hamming distribution. 
On each subsequent day, 50 further images of each token were taken and used to generate test 
fingerprints. Each of these was then compared to the day 0 reference fingerprints, in the same manner, to 
generate hamming distance distributions. From the overlap of the hamming distance distributions, the 
false positive rate (FPR) of each token on each day was calculated.  
 
The FPR provides a quantitative measure of a fingerprint’s uniqueness. The FPR of a fingerprint determines 
the probability of another fingerprint being found that matches the one being tested. It is calculated by 
taking the overlap between the inter- and intra-hamming distance distributions. This is performed by 
calculating the probability that an element of the inter hamming distance distribution falls below the 
maximum element of the intra distribution. It also serves as a metric of the possibility of the fingerprint 
being reproduced.  Thus, providing a measure of the effectiveness of the tokens as a long-term anti-
counterfeiting solution. 
Results 
Group 1 results 
 
Figure 2: a) Top – Images showing photoluminescence (PL) intensity maps from each formulation of the Group 1 tokens captured on the day 
they were created (day 0). Bottom – PL images of each Group 1 token type captured on day 14. The intensity of day 14 images has been 
increased by 30% post-capture to aid visual comparison. i – PMMA, ii – PMS, iii – PS, iv – PVDF, v – SEBS. b) The top of each coloured rectangle 
is the R-LBP generated fingerprint of the labelled QD-PUF on day 0. The middle of each coloured rectangle is the fingerprint from day 14. In the 
bottom image of each rectangle, the white pixels indicate the pixels that changed in value in the fingerprint between day 1 and 14. The 
percentage of pixels that changed value and the composition of each is as follows: i – PMMA, 21.2%, ii – PMS, 24.5%,  iii – PS, 18.9%,  iv – PVDF, 
29.1%  v – SEBS, 19.3%. c) A plot showing the average PL intensity from each token type as a function of time since their creation. An 
exponential decay fit was applied to each (dashed line). The grey dotted line represents the background noise signal from the CCD-sensor. 
 
Figure 3: Top – A plot showing the false positive rate (FPR) of each Group 1 token type, which was derived by comparing fingerprints generated 
from photoluminescence images captured at the times shown after their creation. Bottom – Showing the effective number of independent bits 
(ENIB) extracted from each Group 1 token as a function of days since their creation.  
 
 
Figure 2a shows the PL emission intensity maps measured from each token type as a function of time since 
their creation. Between measurements, the tokens were stored in ambient laboratory conditions, exposed 
to air and moisture. Figure 2b displays the binary fingerprints generated from each token on day 0 
alongside what the fingerprint of the same token looked like on day 14. Figure 2c plots the average 
intensity from each token type, and clearly shows their degradation as they aged, with the effect being 
more pronounced for some encapsulating polymers than others. 
Owing to the oxidation mechanism responsible for the degradation of PL from the CQDs [12] an 
exponential decay fit of the form, y=lmin+A*exp(R0*x) (where lmin represents the asymptote of the PL curve 
and R0 the decay constant) was applied to extrapolate the anticipated emission intensity following 
stabilization after a long period of time. A key metric for practical consideration, is to ensure that the 
emission intensity from the tokens is above the background noise level measured by the CCD sensor – to 
ensure facile measurement of the signal. While this provides no measure of the token’s performance in a 
daylight level environment, it does ensure that the tokens are still emitting to a degree that can be 
measured. Stability tests from Group 1 samples revealed that, among the five types of polymer, PS showed 
the greatest longevity, likely due to resisting oxidization, losing 19.6% of its original intensity over several 
days before stabilizing. The key to the token’s stability is the oxygen diffusion rate of the polymer that the 
dots are embedded in [13]. For example, SEBS triblock copolymer has higher oxygen diffusion rate than the 
PS block [15]. It was found that the stability depended on the type of the polymer host matrix. For 
example, when PVDF was used to create the token, the PL intensity rapidly decayed (losing >80% of its 
intensity in a few days before stabilizing). In comparison, tokens created with PS show a much lower decay 
rate over the period measured. Use of a matched polymer minimizes ligand loss in the encapsulation 
process and minimizes oxygen diffusion to the QD surface [15]. As the lowest asymptotes for the curves 
fitted to the experimental data (for PVDF) was found to be 4.5 times that of the background counts, it is 
clear that all of the polymers provide sufficient stability for tokens created with them to be measured for 
the feasible lifetime of a typical anticounterfeiting device, i.e. several years. 
Figure 2b shows the fingerprints generated on the first and the last day of the trial for each token type, as 
well as a pixel map comparing the difference between them. This gives both a visual representation of the 
fingerprint’s uniqueness and a quantitative measure of how the fingerprints extracted from the tokens 
decay over time.  As can be seen in Figure 1Figure 3a each of the fingerprints do have an initial FPR that 
renders the probability of a forgery being accepted as negligible. Although the reference images were 
taken at the same time as the test images, noise within each image renders this value non-zero. What is of 
particular interest is how the FPR changes over time. Each of the FPR data sets fit an exponential decay 
model.  The origin of this can be traced back to the PL intensity measured from each token, which 
decreases exponentially. The increasing influence of noise as the signal-noise ratio reduces and leads to an 
increasing FPR. This indicates that in order for a generated fingerprint to be stable over time, the emission 
from the dots in the token should also be stable.  
The effective number of independent bits (ENIB) of a particular fingerprint determines the maximum 
length of an authentication key that can be extracted from that fingerprint [16]. Not all bits can be used as 
certain patterns, and trends are repeated over multiple fingerprints. Although it is often standard to 
discuss entropy for authentication metrics in the case of this experiment we are interested in the potential 
applications of such fingerprints. Many applications of such a concept require a minimum number of bits, 
thus making ENIB a more informative metric. To discuss the ENIB, it is best to separate the Group 1 tokens, 
as the PVDF-based token performs differently from the rest. With the exception of PVDF, there is no 
discernible relationship between decreasing PL intensity over time and the measured ENIB, as shown in the 
of Figure 3b. Despite decreases in the PL intensity, the ENIB remains roughly constant. Furthermore, this 
removes a possible link between the initial PL intensity and a token’s starting ENIB. If the two were indeed 
dependant on each other, a dependence between PL intensity and ENIB would be seen at later days. This, 
therefore, implies that the ENIB is instead dependent on the arrangement of the QD pattern and the PL 
intensity stays sufficiently intense that measured noise causes no degradation in the extracted ENIB during 
the course of this trial. This provides further insight into why PVDF has the highest ENIB and has the only 
ENIB with a discernible decrease in value with time. Unlike the other token types, PVDF does not show a 
clustering effect in its pattern; it is more uniform in its distribution. Its lack of a clearly defined structure 
means that it is more susceptible to noise, which is not an issue when there is a high signal-noise ratio. As 
this ratio reduces, however, PVDF’s ENIB drops as the structures in its PL intensity map become more 
difficult to discern. The other token types, the PL images from which show more clustered patterning, 
display similar ENIB values that do not decay significantly over time, despite the decreasing signal-noise 
ratio. 
Group 2 Results 
The aim of the creating the tokens in Group 2 was to study to influence of combining two polymers to 
encapsulate the dots; using a block co-polymer (PLMA) to enhance the stability of emission from the dots 
in the token. Unlike the polymers used in Group 1, PLMA is a high viscous oily liquid that is hydrophobic 
[17], with its elasticity making it suitable for use as a block copolymer to the main polymers used in the 
Group 1 tokens. Alongside this, the addition of PLMA was found to increase the interface angle of the 
surface and/or dot aggregates, which are capable of being used to produce complex identifiers and are 
more difficult to duplicate [18]. 
Figure 4c shows that token type in Group 2 with the fastest temporal decay (PVDFPLMA with a 13.0% drop) 
outperforms the slowest decaying token type in Group 1 (PS with a 19.6% drop). This indicates that the 
viscous copolymer is protecting the dots from degradation, likely by blocking ambient oxygen from 
reaching their surface [15]. It is interesting to note, however, that PVDF containing lacquer is once again 




Figure 4: a) Top – Images showing the photoluminescence (PL) intensity maps from each formulation of the Group 2 tokens captured on the day 
they were created (day 0). Bottom – PL images of each Group 1 token type captured on day 14. The intensity of the day 14 image has not been 
increased post capture, as it was in Figure 2. For each token type the polymer used was: vi – PMMAPLMA, vii – PMSPLMA, viii – PSPLMA, ix – 
PVDFPLMA, x – SEBSPLMA. b) The top of each coloured rectangle is the R-LBP generated fingerprint of the labelled QD-PUF on day 0. The 
middle of each coloured rectangle is the fingerprint from day 14. In the bottom image of each rectangle, the white pixels indicate the pixels that 
changed in value in the fingerprint between day 1 and 14. The percentage of pixels that changed value and the composition of each is as 
follows: vi – PMMAPLMA, 46.5%, vii – PMSPLMA, 41.2%, viii – PSPLMA, 19.5%, ix – PVDFPLMA, 24.12%, x – SEBSPLMA, 15.4%. c) The average 
PL intensity from each token type as a function of time since their creation. An exponential decay fit was applied to each (dashed line). The grey 
dotted line represents the background noise signal from the CCD sensor.  
 
 
Figure 5: Top – Showing the false positive rate (FPR) of each token type in Group 2, which was derived by comparing fingerprints generated 
from photoluminescence captured at the times shown after their creation. Token vi displays no FPR before Day 5 as its value fell below the 
precision of the implementation of the code used MathWorks MATLAB. Bottom – showing the effective number of independent bits extracted 
from each Group 2 token as a function of days since their creation.   
Finally, on the topic of PL is the matter of the long-term viability of utilizing the token’s emission as a PUF. 
Once again, the data in Figure 4c has been fit to an exponential decay model. This shows that the PL from 
the token stabilizes rapidly and emits with an intensity that is significantly above the noise floor of this 
experiment for a long period of time. In the case of the Group 2 tokens, the lowest asymptotic value for the 
PL intensity is for the PMSPLMA based token, which is 12.5 times greater than the background level. This 
shows that all of the token types in Group 2 are indeed suitable for use as PUFs in applications that require 
emission to be visible after a long period of time. 
As with the previous group, Figure 4b gives a visual representation of the generated fingerprints. It 
demonstrates that not only do the fingerprints bear a resemblance to the token they originated from (as 
can be seen from figure 4a) but that each is distinct from that of other tokens. With two exceptions 
(PMMAPLMA and PMSPLMA) each of the FPR curves shown in Figure 5a neatly follows an exponential fit. 
Lending further support to the hypothesis that the FPR is dependent on the signal-noise ratio. The data of 
SEBSPLMA also lends credence to this. The shape of its PL curve is much flatter than the others, with the 
only fluctuations owing to noise, which is reflected in its FPR. PMMAPLMA, on the other hand shows data 
that varies greatly. Its FPR values before day 5 fell below the precision of the implementation of the code 
used in MathWorks MATLAB (namely 10-308) when the data was analysed and so were set to zero. After 
this PMMAPLMA’s FPR rapidly rises and falls again, despite having stable PL. This suggests that there is 
another influential factor the driving force behind this. The most likely reasoning behind this is the 
quantum dot pattern itself and its interpretation by the R-LBP algorithm, making the final fingerprint highly 
susceptible to noise. This is also the likely reasoning behind PMSPLMA’s deviation from a smooth curve. It 
is hypothesized that there are optimal ranges of feature sizes for each radius of R-LBP, however further 
testing is needed to confirm this. The range of initial values achieved (2.6x10-69 to 7.1x10-121) once again 
renders the probability of a forgery being accepted as negligible. When compared to the Group 1 data, it is 
clear that the inclusion of a co-polymer improves the FPR. For PSPLMA, PVDFPLMA and SEBSPLMA, which 
all followed a smooth trend in their data, each showed an improvement on the day 14 value of their FPR 
when compared to their Group 1 counterpart. The origin of this stems from the greatly improved stability 
of the PL intensity that is found in the Group 2 set of tokens. 
In regards to the ENIB of Group 2 the first matter which is apparent is that once again there appears to be 
no discernible link between the PL value of a token type and the ENIB of the fingerprint generated from it. 
As can be seen from comparison of figures 5a and 5b. This indicates that, once again, the value of the ENIB 
is solely dependent on the pattern of the emission from the dots itself.  In this case, however as the 
patterns cannot be separated out into distinct groups based on their type of pattern, no conclusions can be 
drawn as to which patterns benefit ENIB the most. To do this, more stringent criteria to define the 
different types of quantum dot patterns are needed. One approach to this would be based on a histogram 
of feature sizes and could be performed through the non-modified version of LBP. 
Concluding Remarks 
By measuring PL emission from colloidal InP/ZnS quantum dots suspended in a polymer film, and applying 
a modified version of local binary pattern algorithm, tokens were created that can be used as physically 
unclonable functions in anti-counterfeiting applications. The response from these tokens takes the form of 
a 64x64 matrix of bits, in which information is derived from pattern quantum dot clusters that are locked in 
the polymer when it was cured. PL from each of the token formulations tested stabilized at a value above 
the background noise floor of our apparatus. As the FPR of each fingerprint was found to be dependent on 
the signal-noise ratio of the image it was generated from, stabilization of the emission from the token 
resulted in a respective stabilization in the measured FPR. Although it is shown that both groups of token 
types are stable, the addition of PLMA copolymer in the token’s formulation significantly reduced temporal 
decay of the PL intensity and FPR. 
By applying a modified version of the LBP algorithm, it possible to preserve a unique fingerprint generated 
from the optical response of a token, even after substantial degradation. In the worst-case scenario, for 
the token types with temporal FPR dependencies that tended towards an asymptote (e.g. for PVDF in 
Group 1), the probability of a tag incorrectly identifying positively remained below one in a million. This 
ensures that the only methods of copying a token, is to either replicate its fingerprint digitally or by brute 
force guesswork. When coupled with the lack of temporal decay in the ENIB, this ensures that each token 
type (with the exception of PS in Group 1) would be able to be used as secure authentication primitive for 
purposes requiring at least 512-bit keys. 
The security of QD-PUFs lies in their unique nature, and as such, any trends in the patterning that occur in 
the emission from different tokens is detrimental to this. Future analysis of large batches of the most 
promising token types must be carried out to investigate this. Whether these be ensuring no 
manufacturing artefacts are formed on the QD pattern or introducing more entropy to the fingerprints. A 
method to achieve this could be to use the fingerprint as the input for a fuzzy extractor [19]. This would 
take the non-uniformly random fingerprint and use it as a seed for a uniformly random bit string. Thus, 
removing the effect of any trends while maintaining stability. 
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